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Speech-Conditioned Funding and the First
Amendment: New Standard, Old Doctrine, Little
Impact
Heather Blakeman*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

The freedom of speech is so engrained in American society that “[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”1 Yet, Congress
frequently conditions federal funding allocations on requirements that recipients refrain
from or engage in certain speech.2 A recent Supreme Court decision articulated a new
standard to determine when a funding condition that implicates speech is a proper
exercise of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause and when the condition
unconstitutionally burdens recipients’ First Amendment rights.3 In Agency for
International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. (AOSI), the
Court enjoined enforcement of a provision of the Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (Leadership Act), finding that the requirement that
organizations implementing the Act adopt a policy explicitly opposing prostitution4 was
an unconstitutional restriction of their right to free speech.5
Enacted in 2003, the Leadership Act appropriated $48 billion to improve research,
treatment, and prevention programs to combat the international spread of HIV/AIDS.6 In
response to findings that “the sex industry, the trafficking of individuals into such
industry, and sexual violence are additional causes of and factors in the spread of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic,” Congress placed two conditions on the receipt of Leadership Act
funding.7 First, the Act stipulates that funding may not be used to “promote or advocate
the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking.”8 Second, under what is
known as the Policy Requirement, no organization that lacks a “policy explicitly
opposing prostitution and sex trafficking” may receive funding under the Act, except for

* Candidate for J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2015. The author would like to thank
Professor Erin F. Delaney and Professor Jason C. DeSanto for their guidance in support of this article.
1
USAID v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
2
See infra text accompanying notes 57–85.
3
See AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2327–28, 2332.
4
U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2008).
5
AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2332.
6
22 U.S.C. §§ 7601–82 (2008).
7
Id. §§ 7601–23.
8
Id. § 7631(e).
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the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World Health
Organization, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, and any United Nations agency. 9
This article analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in AOSI to strike down the
Policy Requirement and argues that the Court articulated a new speech-conditioned
funding standard, distinguishing between conditions that “define the limits of the
government spending program” and those that “seek to leverage funding to regulate
speech outside the contours of the program itself.”10 This “limits–leverage” standard
consolidated existing speech-conditioned funding doctrines, combining their application
to funding conditions that implicate speech. The standard protects the primary
justification for protecting recipients’ freedom of speech in conditional funding cases—
the development of knowledge—by preserving their ideas and opinions on matters of
public debate. In practice, however, the standard will not protect the speech of most
recipients of speech-conditioned foreign aid. Since the 1980s, Congress has relied
increasingly on foreign organizations to deliver developmental and humanitarian aid, as
they generally have greater access to areas and people in need of foreign aid than their
American counterparts.11 Because Congress can allocate foreign aid funds to foreign
recipients, who are not entitled to First Amendment protection,12 instead of to U.S.
recipients, it can bypass the constitutional limits on speech-conditioned foreign aid
funding. Thus, although conditions that “leverage funding to regulate speech outside the
contours of the program”13 exceed Congress’s power under the Spending Clause, they
will nonetheless prevail with respect to foreign organizations who implement U.S.
foreign aid programs.
Part II of this article reviews the system of U.S. foreign aid funding and the history
of the Leadership Act, the Act challenged in AOSI. Part III discusses the congressional
spending power and the limits imposed on it by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Part IV details the state of First Amendment doctrine with respect to funding conditions
prior to AOSI. Part V describes the litigation leading up to AOSI. Part VI asserts that the
Supreme Court in AOSI articulated a new standard to determine when a funding
condition that implicates free speech is an unconstitutional burden on recipients’ free
speech: whether the condition leverages the congressional spending power to control
speech beyond the federal funding program. Part VII contends that this standard advances
the primary justification behind protecting funding recipients from conditions that restrict
their free speech—the development of knowledge and truth—by preserving a variety of
opinions in the “marketplace of ideas.” Finally, Part VIII argues that in practice, the
AOSI standard will not protect free speech in foreign aid funding programs because
9

Id. § 7631(f). Initially, the Policy Requirement was not enforced against U.S. NGOs. Declaration of Paul
P. Colborn at 13, Brennan Ctr. for Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 09-CV-8756(VM), 2011 WL
4001146 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011). The Department of Justice warned that the restriction “would prevent
or require certain advocacy or positions in activities completely separate from the federally funded
programs . . . [and] cannot be constitutionally applied to U.S. organizations.” Id. However, in 2005, the
Bush administration began enforcing the requirement against U.S. NGOs. Id.
10
AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2328.
11
See USAID, FOREIGN AID IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST: PROMOTING FREEDOM, SECURITY, AND
OPPORTUNITY 117 (2002).
12
DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. USAID, 887 F.2d 275, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
never limited its absolute wording of the principle that nonresident aliens are without First Amendment
rights.”).
13
AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2328.
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Congress will eschew its restrictions by confining fund allocation to foreign recipients,
who are not protected by the First Amendment. Part IX concludes.

II. FEDERAL FUNDING FOR FOREIGN AID
A. Foreign Aid
¶5

¶6

Foreign aid has long been an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.14 While the
President has primary responsibility and power to set U.S. foreign policy objectives,
Congress allocates funds to agencies to implement those policies.15 The U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) is the primary agency through which Congress
distributes foreign aid, established to promote democracy internationally and to provide
aid to developing foreign states.16 The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) also distribute foreign aid funds.17 Foreign
policy, the allocation of foreign aid, and the imposition of conditions on foreign aid funds
all work together to contribute to national interests achieved internationally.18
Throughout American history, and especially today, civil society and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have shared an intimate relationship.
Specifically, nonprofit organizations enjoy a significant role in the social and political
landscape of the country act as laboratories for social change and strategies not feasible
by the U.S. government;19 the U.S. nonprofit sector consists of an estimated 1.58 million
14

Alexander L. George & Robert O. Keohane, The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations, in
PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EFFECTIVE USE OF INFORMATION AND ADVICE
217, 218 (Alexander L. George ed., 1980) (“The concept of national interest continues to be important to
foreign-policymakers . . . . They have used the concept in two different ways: first, as a criterion to assess
what is at stake in any given situation and to evaluate what course of action is ‘best’; second, as a
justification for decisions taken.”).
15
Richard F. Grimmett, U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress (June 1,
1999), available at http://fpc.state.gov/6172.htm.
16
Who We Are, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (“USAID is the lead
U.S. government agency that works to end extreme global poverty and enable resilient, democratic
societies to realize their potential . . . . U.S. foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of
furthering America’s [foreign policy] interests while improving lives in the developing world . . . .
Spending less than 1 percent of the total federal budget, USAID works in over 100 countries” to
accomplish its goals of “protect[ing] human rights” and “improv[ing] global health.”).
17
See CURT TARNOFF & MARIAN LEONARDO LAWSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40213, FOREIGN AID:
AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 21–23 (2011). International developmental aid is also
promulgated by the U.S. State Department. Id.
18
See Felix E. Oppenheim, National Interest, Rationality, and Morality, 15 POL. THEORY
369, 369–70 (1987). The granting of foreign aid to another nation can directly and indirectly serve U.S.
national interests. See Alexander L. George & Robert O. Keohane, The Concept of National Interests: Uses
and Limitations, in PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EFFECTIVE USE OF
INFORMATION AND ADVICE 217 (Alexander L. George ed., 1980) (“Foreign-policy problems . . . typically
engage a multiplicity of competing values and interests . . . . In principle, the criterion of national interest,
which occupies so central a place in discussions of foreign policy, should assist decision-makers to cut
through much of this value complexity . . . .”).
19
See LESTER M. SALAMON & S. WOJCHIECH SOKOLOWSKI, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: DIMENSIONS OF THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR 23 (2004) (“By establishing connections among individuals, involvement in
associations teaches norms of cooperation that carry over into political and economic life.”); see also
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organizations that contributed $836.9 billion to the U.S. economy in 2011, making up 5.6
percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).20 NGOs also contribute
significantly to American society and identity through public charity.21 Finally, the
diverse range of viewpoints among NGOs allows for competition among relevant
interests and thus enhances civic engagement and democracy.22 The nonprofit sector
serves an indispensable role in the fair functioning of the country and in promoting the
interests and welfare of its people.23
Foreign aid funds conditioned on certain requirements of recipient NGOs help
Congress to further its international policy goals. As the primary agency distributing U.S.
foreign aid, USAID frequently collaborates with foreign NGOs to implement U.S.
foreign policy goals within targeted countries.24 While distributing funds that Congress
appropriates for governmental initiatives, USAID “has always had the twofold purpose of
furthering America’s interests while improving lives in the developing world.”25 Given
the efficiency of enlisting an organization with expertise in any given area, the
government has increasingly enlisted NGOs to deliver publicly financed services, and
thus government funding has become the most important source of income for most
charitable nonprofit organizations;26 government funds supply almost a third of nonprofit

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 133 (1898) (arguing that American democracy relies
on the strength and influence of non-governmental associations). “As soon as several of the inhabitants of
the United States have taken up an opinion or a feeling which they wish to promote in the world, they look
out for mutual assistance; and as soon as they have found each other out, they combine.” Id.
20
SARAH L. PETTIJOHN, URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND
VOLUNTEERING 1 (Oct. 16, 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412923-TheNonprofit-Sector-in-Brief.pdf.
21
See id. (“Of the nonprofit organizations registered with the IRS, 501(c)(3) public charities accounted for
more than three-quarters of the nonprofit sector’s revenue and expenses . . . . In 2012, total private giving
from individuals, foundations, and businesses exceeded $300 billion . . . for the first time since the
recession started . . . .”).
22
See J. Craig Jenkins, Nonprofit Organizations and Political Advocacy, in NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK 307, 308 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“Interests are
diverse and inherently subjective. One person’s ‘public good’ may be another’s ‘public bad.’ Those who
claim to speak in the name of the general public can claim no privileged insight.”).
23
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 122 (John Gray ed., Oxford University Press
1991) (1859) (“Government operations tend to be everywhere alike. With individuals and voluntary
associations, on the contrary, there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of experience.”).
24
CURT TARNOFF & MARIAN LEONARDO LAWSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40213, FOREIGN AID: AN
INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 21–23 (2011); see USAID, FOREIGN AID IN THE NATIONAL
INTEREST: PROMOTING FREEDOM, SECURITY, AND OPPORTUNITY 117 (2002), available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usaid/foreign_aid_in_the_national_interest-full.pdf.
25
Who We Are, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are (last updated Jan. 29, 2014).
26
See STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN THE
AGE OF CONTRACTING 4 (1993) (“Rather than relying mostly on private charity and volunteers, most
nonprofit service organizations depend on governmental support for over half of their revenues: for many,
government support comprises their entire budget. In contrast to the traditional image of government and
nonprofits as two independent sectors, the new relationship amounts to one of mutual dependence.”); see
also LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 13 (2d ed. 1999) (“[There is] often a
preference for some nongovernmental mechanism to deliver services and respond to public needs because
of the cumbersomeness, unresponsiveness, and bureaucratization that often accompanies governmental
action . . . . Even when government financing is viewed as essential . . . it is often the case that private,
nonprofit organizations are utilized to deliver the services that government finances.”).

30

Vol. 13:1]

Heather Blakeman

revenues, more than twice as much as private charitable giving.27 The government and
the nonprofit sector are mutually dependent on each other to make public service works
possible.28
B. The Leadership Act
¶8

¶9

Although the U.S. government has been combatting the spread of HIV/AIDS since
1986,29 2001 brought the epidemic into the international spotlight, when the United
Nations adopted the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, urging members to
establish policies and dedicate aid towards the prevention, treatment, and collaboration
needed to stop and reverse the HIV/AIDS pandemic.30 UNAIDS estimated 35.3 million
people were living with HIV in 2012, with 2.3 million new HIV infections globally.31 In
response to urging from President George W. Bush, Congress enacted the Leadership Act
in 2003 to combat the global spread of the diseases.32 Congress’s stated purpose of the
Act is “to strengthen and enhance United States leadership and the effectiveness of the
United States response to the HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria pandemics and other
related and preventable infectious diseases as part of the overall United States health and
development agenda.”33 The Leadership Act prescribes, inter alia, a comprehensive
strategy to fight the international spread of HIV/AIDS.34 Pursuant to that plan, Congress
appropriated $48 billion to the Executive Branch to allocate to NGOs and foreign
governments35 to improve treatment and prevention programs, especially for those at high
risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, and to improve technical assistance, training and
research.36
In response to findings that “the sex industry, the trafficking of individuals into such
industry, and sexual violence are additional causes of and factors in the spread of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic,”37 Congress placed two conditions on the receipt of funding. First,
funding may not be used to “promote or advocate the legalization or practice of
prostitution or sex trafficking.”38 Second, under what is known as the Policy
Requirement, no organization that lacks a “policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex
27

SARAH L. PETTIJOHN, URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND
VOLUNTEERING 3 (Oct. 16, 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412923-TheNonprofit-Sector-in-Brief.pdf.
28
For how insufficient government funding has an injurious effect on both nonprofit organizations and the
general public, see NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, COSTS, COMPLEXIFICATION, AND CRISIS:
GOVERNMENT’S HUMAN SERVICES CONTRACTING “SYSTEM” HURTS EVERYONE (Oct. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.govtcontracting.org/sites/default/files/Costs%20Complexification%20and%20Crisis.pdf.
29
HIV and AIDS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/global-health/hiv-andaids (last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
30
G.A. Res. S-26/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-26/2 (June 27, 2001).
31
UNAIDS, GLOBAL REPORT: UNAIDS REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 4 (2013), available at
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/epidemiology/2013/gr2013/UNAIDS_Gl
obal_Report_2013_en.pdf.
32
See 22 U.S.C. §§ 7601–25, 30 (2006).
33
Id. § 7603.
34
Id. § 7603.
35
Id. §§ 7671(a), 7631.
36
Id. § 7611(a).
37
Id. §§ 7601–23.
38
Id. § 7631(e).
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trafficking” may receive funding under the Act, except for the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World Health Organization, the International AIDS
Vaccine Initiative, and any United Nations agency. 39 The Policy Requirement prohibits
non-exempted recipients from “engag[ing] in activities that are inconsistent with their
opposition to prostitution and sex trafficking.”40 Further, affected recipients must state in
their funding documents that they are “opposed to the practices of prostitution and sex
trafficking because of the psychological and physical risks they pose for women, men,
and children.”41

III. CONGRESSIONAL SPENDING AND ITS LIMITS
A. Congressional Spending Power
¶10

Congress enjoys expansive powers to authorize funding to advance its policy goals. 42
The Constitution grants Congress the power to lay and collect taxes “to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”43 Under the
Spending Clause, Congress has broad discretion to spend for the general welfare, which
includes the power to fund particular governmental or private programs or activities.44
Incident to this power, Congress may impose limits on the use of federal funds to ensure
that recipients spend them according to congressional intent.45 Thus, Congress may use
conditional funding to induce behavior that it could not regulate directly.46

39

Id. § 7631(f). Initially, the Policy Requirement was not enforced against U.S. NGOs. Declaration of Paul
P. Colborn at 13, Brennan Ctr. for Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 09-CV-8756(VM), 2011 WL
4001146 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011). The Department of Justice warned that the restriction “would prevent
or require certain advocacy or positions in activities completely separate from the federally funded
programs . . . [and] cannot be constitutionally applied to U.S. organizations.” Id. However, in 2005, the
Bush administration began enforcing the requirement against U.S. NGOs. Id.
40
HHS Organization Integrity of Entities That Are Implementing Programs and Activities Under the
Leadership Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,760, 18,760 (Apr. 13, 2010) (codified in part at 45 C.F.R. § 89 (2014));
see also USAID Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive 05-04 amend. 3, Implementation of the United
States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, as amended – Eligibility
Limitation on the Use of Funds and Opposition to Prostitution and Sex Trafficking (2010).
41
45 C.F.R. § 89.1 (2014) (emphasis added).
42
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936) (“Congress . . . has a substantive power to tax and to
appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of
the United States.”).
43
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
44
USAID v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (2013).
45
E.g., S.D. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that Congress may condition federal highway
funds on a requirement that states prohibit the purchase and possession of alcohol by a person who is less
than twenty-one years of age under the spending power).
46
Id. at 206–07 (“Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly
employed the power to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Butler, 297 U.S. at 66 (“[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public
moneys for public purposes is not limited by direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”).
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B. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine

¶11

¶12

While the Spending Clause accords Congress extensive power to administer and
condition funds, such conditions must not be unconstitutional.47 Generally, when “a party
objects to a condition on the receipt of federal funding, its recourse is to decline the
funds.”48 However, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides that the
“government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a
constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.”49 Thus,
a condition that coerces recipients into relinquishing their constitutional rights, for
example, by leaving recipients no practical choice but to accept the funds, is an
unconstitutional condition.50 In a seminal unconstitutional conditions case, Speiser v.
Randall, the Supreme Court held that a state law that conditioned veterans’ receipt of a
property tax exemption (reasoned to be equivalent to a cash grant) on a declaration that
they would not advocate the overthrow of the government impermissibly coerced the
individuals to refrain from constitutionally protected speech.51
Although a condition that infringes on a recipient’s constitutionally protected rights
is unlawful “even if he has no entitlement to that benefit,”52 the Court has upheld
conditions that are merely decisions by Congress not to subsidize a particular message or
activity.53 The Court has rejected the “notion that First Amendment rights are somehow
not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State.”54 A series of doctrines has
developed to determine whether federal funds conditioned on infringements of free
speech are permissible exercises of the congressional spending power or whether they
unconstitutionally encroach on recipients’ First Amendment rights.

47

Dole, 483 at 208–09 (establishing the general standard of review for congressional conditional spending:
(1) spending must be in pursuit of the “general welfare”; (2) Congress must unambiguously declare the
condition such that the recipient can make an informed decision as to whether to accept the funds; (3) the
condition must be rationally related to the government’s interest in the funding; and (4) the condition may
not be otherwise unconstitutional).
48
AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2328.
49
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989).
50
See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958).
51
Id. at 518 (“To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to
penalize them for such speech.”).
52
See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003) (“Under this doctrine, the
government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . .
freedom of speech even if he has not entitlement to that benefit.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
53
See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (upholding a condition on family planning funds
that prevented recipients from using the funds in programs where abortion was a method of family
planning, finding that Congress could “selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes
to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal
with the problem in another way.”); see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S.
540, 546 (1983) (upholding a restriction on tax-exempt organizations that prohibited them from lobbying
because “Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”).
54
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Regan, 461
U.S. at 549 (“[A] legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
infringe the right.”).
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IV. SPEECH-CONDITIONED FUNDING DOCTRINE
¶13

Congress frequently offers funds to organizations on a condition that they refrain
from or engage in certain speech.55 Such conditional funding requires courts to balance
Congress’s broad spending power with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by
making value decisions as to “what speech is protected, under what circumstances, and
when and how the government may regulate” to ensure funds are used appropriately.56
The Supreme Court has developed a complex set of doctrines to conduct this balancing,
applying different tests in particular contexts. These doctrines determine when speechrelated conditions unconstitutionally burden recipients’ First Amendment rights.
A. The Alternative Channels Test

¶14

¶15

To determine whether a funding condition that implicates free speech is
unconstitutional, the Court has assessed whether the restriction precludes alternative
channels for expression. If the recipient does not have an adequate venue through which
to express the restricted speech, the restriction is unconstitutional.57 In Federal
Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California, a condition that
prohibited television station recipients of federal funds for public broadcasting from
engaging in any editorializing left recipients without an alternative venue of expression
because it prevented their “speech” (editorializing) regardless of whether it was publicly
or privately funded.58 Thus, the condition was unconstitutional because it did not allow
for adequate alternative channels of expression.59
By contrast, in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, the Court
upheld a requirement that nonprofit organizations seeking tax exemption status (reasoned
to be equivalent to a cash grant) refrain from lobbying.60 In his concurrence, Justice
Blackmun found that recipients’ ability to lobby by creating an affiliate, tax-paying
organization saved what would otherwise have been an unconstitutional restriction on
speech.61 He was satisfied that the creation of an affiliate was an adequate alternative
means by which to engage in protected speech.62

55

See infra text accompanying notes 57–85.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1426 (1989); see also
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 570, 950–51 (4th ed. 2011).
57
See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984); cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
58
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400.
59
See id. at 395. The Court was especially suspicious of the prohibition against editorializing because it
prohibited expression of the station’s viewpoints. See infra text accompanying notes 65–72. Because
“expression on public issues has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values,” the condition was subject to heightened scrutiny. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 384
(“Since . . . [t]he First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on
particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic, we must be particularly
wary in assessing [the condition] to determine whether it reflects an impermissible attempt to allow a
government to control the search for political truth.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
60
Regan, 461 U.S. at 554.
61
Id. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
62
Id.
56
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Similarly, in Rust v. Sullivan, the Court upheld a restriction on “Title X” family
planning funds that prohibited recipients from using the funds in programs where
abortion was a method of family planning.63 The Court held that recipients had adequate
alternative channels to express their views on abortion, since the restriction acted only on
Title X programs and did not forbid recipients from engaging in abortion-related
activities using other funds.64
B. Viewpoint-Based Discrimination

¶17

¶18

Restrictions on viewpoint-based speech may also be unconstitutional. Conditions
that regulate the content of speech are suspect, as such restrictions “raise . . . the specter
that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace,”65 especially where those topics are matters of public importance.66 In
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court held that a
public university magazine’s funding policy that refused funding to a Christian-based
publication impermissibly impacted viewpoint-based speech.67 Because the policy
discriminated against a journal with a particular viewpoint, it was an unconstitutional
restriction on its freedom of speech.68
The Court also invalidated a viewpoint-based restriction in Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez.69 There, the Legal Services Corporation Act, designed to support legal
services for indigent clients, prohibited recipients from representing clients who wished
to challenge existing welfare law.70 By defining the scope of the legal representation it
funded to exclude certain ideas, Congress imposed a viewpoint-based condition.71 The
Court held that the restriction impermissibly violated recipients’ First Amendment rights
because it confined their ideas about their own government.72
C. Compelled Speech Versus Compelled Silence

¶19

A condition that requires recipients to affirmatively espouse Congress’s viewpoint is
more suspect than a condition that compel silence.73 In West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, the Court found that a requirement that students salute the flag in
school impermissibly compelled speech, and that “involuntary affirmation could be
commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.”74 Similarly,
63

500 U.S. 173 (1991).
Id. at 198.
65
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)
(invalidating a state law requiring an ex-convict to remit profits earned from publishing a book describing
his crimes to the state on the grounds that the restriction impermissibly imposed content-based financial
disincentives on speech).
66
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 384 (1984).
67
515 U.S. 819, 836–37 (1995).
68
Id. at 830–31.
69
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
70
Id. at 549.
71
Id. at 542.
72
Id. at 548.
73
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).
74
Id.
64
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Wooley v. Maynard addressed a requirement that drivers display the state motto on their
license plates.75 The Court held that the requirement was an unconstitutional invasion into
freedom of speech by forcing the individual to portray the state’s message.76 These cases
suggest that Congress must present stronger interests to compel speech than to require
silence.77
D. Government Speech
¶20

¶21

Under the government speech doctrine, Congress can condition funds that either
create programs in which the government itself is the speaker or enlist private speakers to
communicate its message.78 Indeed, the government must be able to express itself in
order to properly function and to add its viewpoints for richer public debates.79 When
Congress funds a program to convey a government message, it may impose speech
restrictions to ensure its message is neither “garbled nor distorted” by the recipient.80
Whether speech-conditioned funds fall within the ambit of government speech turns
on whether the funds act on the program or the recipient.81 In Velazquez, for example, the
Court found that Congress designed the legal clinic subsidies to regulate the private
speech of the lawyers rather than to communicate government speech because the
prohibition on challenges to the welfare law acted on the recipients, the lawyers, rather
than on the program.82 In Rust, on the other hand, the Title X programs were venues of
government speech, transmitted by private doctors,83 because the condition prohibiting
abortion-related activities in the program worked on the program itself rather than on the

75

430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
Id. at 715.
77
See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. USAID, 651 F.3d 218, 242 (2d Cir. 2011) (Straub, J.,
dissenting) (“The Supreme Court has suggested, without holding, that the government may be required to
assert an even more compelling interest when it infringes the right to refrain from speaking than is required
when it infringes the right to speak.”); cf. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (“The right to speak and the right to
refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of
mind.’” (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637)).
78
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“We have said that viewpoint-based funding
decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker, or instances, like Rust,
in which the government used private speakers to transmit information pertaining to its own program.”
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
79
David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded
Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 702 (1992).
80
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (characterizing the
Court’s decision in Rust as recognizing “that [w]hen the government disburses public funds to private
entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its
message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.”).
81
Francis R. Hill, Speaking Truth to the Power the Funds Them: A Jurisprudence of Association for
Advocacy Organizations Financially Dependent on Government Grants and Contracts, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 363, 398 (2012).
82
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 547.
83
Id. at 541 (construing the condition in Rust as a way for Congress to “use[] private speakers to transmit
information pertaining to its own program.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The Court in Rust did not
place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted
to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust on
this understanding.” Id.
76
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recipients.84 Although Congress made a policy choice in Rust that discriminated by
viewpoint, that choice was permissible because its purpose was not to suppress an
unpopular idea but to choose the message of the government, the limits of which
Congress was free to define.85
E. The Interplay of the Speech-Conditioned Funding Doctrines: Inconsistent Application
¶22

¶23

The Supreme Court has applied each of these First Amendment funding doctrines in
different combinations and in different contexts. In League of Women Voters, the Court
reviewed both whether the television station recipients had alternative channels of
communicating editorialized content and the viewpoint-based nature of the restriction
against editorializing.86 Combining these doctrines, the Court stated in dicta that if the
stations had a privately-funded alternative, such a venue for editorialized broadcasts
would have saved the constitutionality of the viewpoint-based nature of the restriction.87
Similarly, in Velazquez, the Court rejected the government’s argument that restricting
litigators from challenging the welfare law was a means to government speech on the
matter, and instead found that the condition was an impermissible viewpoint-based
restriction against challenges to the welfare law.88 In Rust, the nature of the Title X
programs as government speech and the recipients’ alternative channels to engage in
abortion-related activity overrode the viewpoint-based nature of prohibiting speech on
abortion.89
Although the Court has often drawn on more than one of the speech-conditioned
funding doctrines to determine whether a funding condition violated free speech, it has
not clarified whether or how these doctrines systematically interact with one another.
Their application has been ad hoc, as the Court has considered some and not others in
various cases, leaving little direction to future litigators. Further, the Court often has
declined to articulate the controlling doctrine of each holding. The Court in AOSI applied
the speech-conditioned funding doctrines more systematically than it has in the past by
articulating a new standard for determining the constitutionality of a funding condition
that implicated free speech. The following section describes the road to that decision.

V. LEADERSHIP ACT LITIGATION
A. AOSI District Court
¶24

In 2005, a group of NGOs implementing the Leadership Act challenged the Policy
Requirement, which conditioned Leadership Act funds on a statement that the recipient
rejects the practices of prostitution and sex trafficking, claiming that it violated their First
84

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194, 196 (1991) (“Title X expressly distinguishes between a Title X
grantee and a Title X project . . . . The regulations govern the scope of the Title X funds project’s
activities, and leave the grantee unfettered in its other activities.”).
85
Id. at 194.
86
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
87
Id. at 400–01.
88
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001).
89
Rust, 500 U.S. at 198.
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Amendment rights to free speech.90 The plaintiff organizations operated international
programs to fight HIV/AIDS through family planning services, sexual health counseling,
and intravenous drug use education.91 They sued the federal agencies primarily
responsible for overseeing implementation of the Act—USAID, HHS, and CDC—
seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment that the Policy Requirement violated
their First Amendment right to free speech.92 They further contended that the Requirement
contradicted the purpose of the Act by hindering their ability to work with sex workers to
reduce their risk of contracting HIV/AIDS.93
The agencies countered that the Policy Requirement was a proper condition of
federal funding within Congress’s spending power.94 They further argued that one of the
purposes of the Leadership Act was to eradicate prostitution and sex trafficking and that
the government was not obligated to subsidize activities contrary to that goal.95 Finally,
the agencies asserted that the Leadership Act funds promulgated a government message
that the United States denounces the practices of prostitution and sex trafficking and that
the Policy Requirement was a proper means to protect that message from being garbled
by recipients who would use private funds to “[endorse], either implicitly or explicitly,
the very practices that the program aims to eliminate.”96
The district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the agencies from
enforcing the Policy Requirement.97 It found that the Policy Requirement’s suppression
of “eminently debatable questions such as what may be the most appropriate or effective
policy to engage high-risk groups” in efforts to combat HIV/AIDS imposed an
impermissible viewpoint-based condition.98 Additionally, the Policy Requirement
compelled speech by forcing recipients to affirmatively denounce the practice of
prostitution, making the viewpoint-based discrimination “even more offensive to the First
Amendment.”99 Finally, the court rejected the agencies’ assertion that the Act created a
90

Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. USAID, 430 F. Supp. 2d 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 230.
92
Id. at 238. In 2005, DKT International, one of the largest private providers of family planning services,
also challenged the constitutionality of the Policy Requirement. DKT Int’l, Inc. v. USAID, 435 F. Supp. 2d
5 (D.D.C. 2006), rev’d, 477 F.3d 758, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also About DKT, DKT INT’L,
http:www.dktinternational.org/about-dkt (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). The court struck down the Policy
Requirement because it was a viewpoint-based condition that was insufficiently tailored to advance the
government interest in maintaining integrity of its program. DKT Int’l, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 5, 13–14. On
appeal, the circuit court reversed, holding that the Policy Requirement was a permissible condition on a
government-speech program. DKT Int’l, 477 F.3d at 761. The court reasoned that Congress can
communicate a particular viewpoint through private speakers and may constitutionally require that those
speakers do not convey contrary messages. Id. (“When it communicates its message, either through public
officials or private entities, the government can—and often must—discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint.”). The court also found that the Policy Requirement did not prevent alternative means by which
DKT could engage in its speech. Id. at 763 (“Nothing prevents DKT from itself remaining neutral and
setting up a subsidiary organization that certifies it has a policy opposing prostitution.”).
93
AOSI, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 276.
94
Id. at 261–62.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 278.
98
Id. at 263.
99
Id. at 274. It is unclear from the text whether the compulsive nature of the Policy Requirement elevated
the need for heightened scrutiny. See id.
91
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government speech program because the exemption of certain organizations from the
condition enabled the those recipients to make endorsements contrary to the message the
government claimed to protect.100
B. AOSI Circuit Court
¶27

¶28

The agencies appealed the district court decision.101 While the appeal was pending,
HHS and USAID issued “organizational integrity” guidance (collectively, the
“Guidelines”) designed to ameliorate the Policy Requirement’s constitutional
decencies.102 The Guidelines allowed recipients to establish affiliated organizations not
bound by the Policy Requirement, provided the recipients retained “objective integrity
and independence.”103 A number of factors determined whether sufficient separation
existed between a recipient and its affiliate, including: (1) whether the organizations were
legally separate; (2) whether the organizations employed separate personnel; (3) the
existence of separate accounting records; (4) whether the organizations used separate
facilities; and (5) the existence of signs distinguishing between the organizations.104 In
light of the new Guidelines, the circuit court remanded the case.105 The district court then
issued another preliminary injunction,106 finding that the Guidelines cured neither the
Policy Requirement’s discrimination against viewpoint-based speech nor its obligation to
affirmatively adopt certain speech because the Guidelines required such a stark degree of
separation between the recipients and the affiliates that they were ineffectual in
remedying the burden on recipients’ First Amendment rights.107
The Second Circuit affirmed the injunction.108 The court rejected the agencies’
argument that the Policy Requirement protected government speech, noting that the
stated purpose of the Leadership Act was to combat HIV/AIDS rather than to eradicate
prostitution.109 The exemption for certain organizations further supported the finding that
opposing prostitution could not have been a central goal of the Act.110 Further, the
Guidelines did not provide adequate alternative channels for speech because an affiliate’s

100

Id. at 269.
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. USAID, 254 F.App’x 843 (2d Cir. 2007).
102
See 45 C.F.R. § 89 (2014).
103
Id. § 89.3.
104
Id.
105
AOSI, 254 F.App’x 843.
106
The court also extended the preliminary injunction to the U.S.-based members of co-plaintiffs Global
Health Council and InterAction, which include nearly all of the U.S. NGOs implementing the Act. Alliance
for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. USAID, 570 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
107
See id. at 545–49 (“While the Guidelines may or may not provide an adequate alternative channel for
Plaintiffs to express their views regarding prostitution, the clause requiring Plaintiffs to adopt the
Government’s view regarding the legalization of prostitution remains in tact. Plaintiffs are still not
permitted to abstain from taking a view with regard to prostitution, but rather, are required to espouse the
Government’s position.”).
108
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. USAID, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011).
109
Id. at 238.
110
Id. (The government “cannot now recast the Leadership Act’s global HIV/AIDS-prevention program as
an anti-prostitution messaging campaign,” lest the First Amendment be reduced to a “simple semantic
exercise.”).
101
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ability to engage in privately-funded silence did not cure recipients of the affirmative
speech requirement of the Act.111

VI. SUPREME COURT DECISION
¶29

¶30

¶31

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court, holding that the Policy
Requirement violated the recipients’ First Amendment rights to free speech.112 To
determine whether the Requirement unconstitutionally infringed upon recipients’ free
speech, the Court articulated a new standard that distinguished between conditions that
“define the limits of the government spending program—those that specify the activities
Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate
speech outside the contours of the program itself.”113 Under this standard, the relevant
distinction is between conditions that Congress may properly impose to limit the use of
federal funds and conditions that impermissibly leverage the spending power to control
speech beyond the intent of the statute appropriating the funds.
While it is well-established that Congress may limit funding to the programs it
wants to subsidize,114 the limits–leverage standard contrasts that power to the leveraging
of funds to regulate speech. As described above, the Court has consistently held that
Congress may condition funds on behavior that it could not directly legislate as long as
the condition does not violate recipients’ constitutional rights.115 To determine whether a
funding condition that implicates free speech is unconstitutional, the limits–leverage
standard asks whether the condition manipulates recipients beyond that which is
necessary to protect the purpose of the federal funding program.116
Although this bilateral distinction is new, what it relies on is old. The AOSI Court
employed the reasoning of the four traditional speech-conditioned funding doctrines to
ascertain whether the Policy Requirement was a proper limit or unacceptable leverage,
but applied them in a new way.117 While the protection of government speech allows
Congress to limit the use of federal funds, inadequate alternative channels, viewpointbased discrimination, and compelled speech reveal conditions that unconstitutionally
leverage funds. Applying the limits–leverage standard to the Policy Requirement of the
Leadership Act, the Court found that the Requirement’s lack of alternative channels, its
111

Id. at 239 (“It simply does not make sense to conceive of the Guidelines here as somehow addressing the
Policy Requirement's affirmative speech requirement by affording an outlet to engage in privately funded
silence; in other words, by providing an outlet to do nothing at all. It may very well be that the Guidelines
afford Plaintiffs an adequate outlet for expressing their opinions on prostitution, but there remains, on top
of that, the additional, affirmative requirement that the recipient entity pledge its opposition to
prostitution.”).
112
USAID v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
113
Id. at 2328.
114
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“[W]hen the Government appropriates public funds to
establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program.”); see also supra text accompanying
notes 42–46.
115
See supra text accompanying notes 47–54.
116
AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2328 (“‘Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its
program in every case, lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exercise.’” (quoting
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001))).
117
See infra text accompanying notes 119–136.
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viewpoint-based discrimination, and its compulsory nature, in addition to its failure to act
as a protection of government speech, revealed that the Requirement fell clearly outside
of the permissible limitations of a government spending program.118 This section outlines
the consolidation of the traditional speech-conditioned funding doctrines into the new
limits–leverage standard.
A. Alternative Channels Test
¶32

¶33

¶34

To determine whether the Policy Requirement allowed Congress to leverage funds
to regulate speech outside the scope of the Leadership Act, the Court looked to whether
the Policy Requirement tolerated alternative channels for expression on prostitution.119
Finding that a “recipient cannot avow the belief dictated by the Policy Requirement when
spending Leadership Act funds, and . . . assert a contrary belief, or claim neutrality, when
participating in activities on its own time and dime,” the Court concluded that Leadership
Act recipients did not have alternative channels to express their views on prostitution.120
The Court analogized to League of Women Voters, in which the Court struck down a
condition that prohibited broadcasting recipients from any editorializing.121 The AOSI
Court emphasized that the condition went beyond the stated purpose of ensuring that
federal funds were not used to editorialize public broadcasting and instead “leveraged the
federal funding to regulate the stations’ speech outside the scope of the program.”122
Applying the alternative channels test to the Policy Requirement, the Court found that
because it prohibited recipients from acting contrary to the pledge against prostitution,
even when using private funds, it regulated conduct outside of the program.123
The Court rejected the agencies’ argument that the Guidelines served as an adequate
channel, finding that the establishment of an affiliate cures the infringement of free
speech only when the affiliate “allow[s] an organization bound by a funding condition to
exercise its First Amendment rights outside the scope of the federal program.”124 Here,
affiliates could not serve that purpose, since they had to be sufficiently separate from the
recipient such that “the arrangement does not afford a means for the recipient to express
its beliefs.”125 Because the Guidelines did not allow recipients to express their views on
prostitution, the Policy Requirement left no room for alternative channels of
expression.126
118

See AOSI, 133 S. Ct. 2321.
Id.
120
Id. at 2330.
121
Id.; FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 399 (1984).
122
AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2329.
123
See id. at 2330. While the agencies’ second appeal was pending, USAID and HHS promulgated
regulations and guidance that prohibited non-exempted recipients from “engag[ing] in activities that are
inconsistent with their opposition to prostitution and sex trafficking.” HHS Organization Integrity of
Entities That Are Implementing Programs and Activities Under the Leadership Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,760,
18,760 (Apr. 13, 2010) (codified in part at 45 C.F.R. § 89 (2014)); see USAID Acquisition & Assistance
Policy Directive 05-04 amend. 3, Implementation of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, as amended – Eligibility Limitation on the Use of Funds and
Opposition to Prostitution and Sex Trafficking (2010).
124
AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2331.
125
Id.
126
Id.
119
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B. Viewpoint-Based Discrimination
¶35

The Court continued by analyzing the Policy Requirement under the viewpointbased discrimination theory. The Court found that because the Act required that
recipients espouse the government’s position on “an issue of public concern, the
condition by its very nature affects ‘protected conduct outside the scope of the federally
funded program.’”127 Thus, the Court reasoned, the Requirement crossed the line from
defining a federally-funded program to using funds to regulate beyond it by defining the
recipient’s views on a controversial issue.128
C. Compelled Speech Versus Compelled Silence

¶36

As further evidence that the Policy Requirement allowed Congress to regulate
outside the Leadership Act program, the Court also highlighted its affirmative nature. The
Requirement “compels as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by
its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the Government program.”129 By forcing
recipients to affirmatively declare opposition to prostitution, the condition regulated
policy beyond the program to combat HIV/AIDS.130
D. Government Speech

¶37

To further draw the distinction between proper limits and impermissible leveraging,
the Court inquired whether the Leadership Act established government speech that
Congress may properly protect.131 In Rust, Congress could prohibit funds from being used
in programs where abortion was a method of family planning, as the restriction was
meant to control the governmental message conveyed by the Title X programs.132
According to the AOSI Court, Congress defined Title X to encourage only certain
methods of family planning, such that the “regulations were simply designed to ensure
that the limits of the federal program are observed, and that public funds [are] spent for
the purposes for which they were authorized.”133 The Policy Requirement, on the other
hand, fell beyond the confines of government speech because it acted on the recipient
rather than on the government program.134 Because the Act already prohibited recipients
from using the funds to “promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution
or sex trafficking,”135 the Court found that the Policy Requirement must have been
something more than a limit to protect the government’s views, thus reinforcing the line
127

Id. at 2330 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991)).
Id.; see Rust, 500 U.S. at 197.
129
AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2332.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.; see Rust, 500 U.S. at 197.
133
AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2339–30 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The AOSI Court
also found that Rust involved a mere non-subsidy and that Congress could “selectively fund certain
programs to address an issue of public concern, without funding alternative ways of addressing the same
problem.” Id. at 2329.
134
Id. at 2330–31 (“By requiring recipients to profess a specific belief, the Policy Requirement goes
beyond defining the limits of a federally funded program to defining the recipient.”).
135
22 U.S.C. § 7631(e) (2008).
128
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between the specifications of a federal program and the use of funds to control behavior
outside of it.136
E. Understanding the Limits–Leverage Standard
¶38

¶39

¶40

The limits–leverage standard distinguishes between restrictions intended to protect
the purposes of a federal spending program and those designed to regulate speech beyond
those purposes. In AOSI, the Court reframed the existing speech-conditioned doctrines,
bundling them together to decipher when a condition that encroaches on free speech
unlawfully restricts recipients’ First Amendment rights.
Prior to AOSI, the Court often cited more than one doctrine in deciding speechconditioned funding cases,137 but never before articulated a broad standard incorporating
them all. Instead, in preceding cases, the Court seemed to select one or more of the
speech-conditioned funding doctrines based on the particular facts of the case. In this
way, the Court can be said to have grabbed the nearest fire extinguisher to put out the
precise issue at hand, without regard to other doctrines that did not immediately apply to
the distinct set of facts. Unlike other areas of law that are defined, at least in form (if not
in application), by clear rules, in speech-conditioned funding cases the Court has reached
to the doctrine(s) that most easily applied to the specific facts. The result has been that
each case internally coheres, but together the doctrines have not developed into a
systematic test that allows parties to predict which speech-related conditions will be
upheld and which will not.
Although the limits–leverage standard is a far cry from a bright-line rule, it employs
more than a fact-specific solution to funding restrictions that infringe upon free speech by
consolidating the traditional speech-conditioned funding doctrines. It is unclear whether,
under the AOSI standard, a court may still apply only one or some of the doctrines to a
particular restriction while ignoring the others. Nevertheless, the standard draws a new
line between the limits of federal spending and the exploitation of funds to regulate
beyond the program.

VII. RATIONALES FOR FREE SPEECH PROTECTION FOR RECIPIENTS OF SPEECHCONDITIONED FUNDING
¶41

The First Amendment declares that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”138 While many rationales for protecting free speech exist, three
values are particularly important: (1) search for truth and advancement of knowledge;139
136

AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2331.
See supra text accompanying notes 86–89.
138
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
139
The search for truth rationale is premised on the notion that the “ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas.” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); see JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 51–52 (John Gray ed., Oxford University Press 1991) (1859) (“[Free speech
furthers the revelation of truth because it reveals] that the received opinion may be false, and some other
opinion, consequently, true; or that, the received opinion being true, a conflict with the opposite error is
essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth . . . [or] when the conflicting doctrines, instead
of being one true and the other false, share the truth between them; and the nonconforming opinion is
137
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(2) individual self-fulfillment;140 and (3) effective participation in democratic politics.141
Each of these justifications for protecting free speech provides a persuasive account of
First Amendment doctrine, and each maintains a significant position in popular discourse
and scholarship.142
Of these three rationales, however, the development of knowledge justification
corresponds most exactly with conditional funding cases. This rationale is frequently
explained by the “marketplace of ideas,” premised on the notion that truth and error will
most easily be discovered if society may speak freely and the government does not
intervene in speech and press freedom.143 Under this theory, any opinion, whether wrong,
partially true, or wholly correct, has value in challenging prevailing opinions.144 To refuse
a hearing to an opinion is to encumber both free speech and the development of truth and
knowledge.145
The self-fulfillment rationale fails to explain protection for recipients of speechconditioned funding because those recipients are almost always organizations, rather than
individuals. The self-realization justification rests on human nature, asserting that free
speech serves the “development of the individual’s powers and abilities” and “the
individual’s control of his or her own destiny.”146 While self-expression by an
organization may help the individuals within it to develop their abilities or to control their
future, such expression is a step removed from the individualistic nature of the selffulfillment rationale.147
The theory of free speech as necessary for democracy is similarly ineffective for
rationalizing free speech protection for funding recipients. The argument for free speech
from a democratic theory rests on the assumption that in order for government to be “by
needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part.”); see
also JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENCED
PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND 60 (Nov. 23, 1644) (“Let [Truth] and Fals[e]hood grapple;
who ever knew Truth put to the wors[e], in a free and open encounter[?]”).
140
Free expression sustains self-fulfillment by allowing the exercise of human capacity to create and
express through speech. David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of
the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
141
The self-governance rationale asserts that, in a democratic system, citizens must be able to voice their
views on general welfare issues so that representatives may understand the concerns and ideas of the
constituency, and to ensure the public is well-informed before making decisions. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET
AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10–11 (3d ed. 2008) (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 15, 24–27, 39 (1948)); see also Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times
Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUPP. CT. REV. 191, 208 (1964).
142
C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990–91
(1978); see also Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593–94 (1982).
143
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But when men have
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”).
144
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 54 (John Gray ed., Oxford University Press 1991)
(1859) (“[O]nly through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intellect, a chance of
fair play to all sides of the truth.”).
145
Id.
146
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 592 (1982).
147
See id.; see also David. A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
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the people, for the people,”148 citizens must be able to engage in meaningful debate149 and
that citizens must be able to voice their views on public issues so that representatives may
understand the concerns and ideas of the constituency.150 Although organizations also
participate in civil society and politics, democracy places sovereignty in individuals, not
entities. Thus, the democratic theory for free speech is an insufficient justification for
speech protections with respect to funding conditions.
The development of knowledge rationale justifies the protection of recipients of
speech-conditioned funding. First, it applies equally well to individuals and entities, since
opinions contributing to knowledge can be promulgated by either. Second, speech-related
conditions on funding restrict opinions on issues of public importance from the public
discourse. In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that “the criterion of unconstitutionality
is whether the denial of the subsidy threatens to drive certain ideas or viewpoints from
the marketplace.”151 In League of Women Voters, the condition prevented broadcasters
from expressing their opinions through editorializing.152 In Velazquez, the condition
prevented legal aid recipients from expressing their opinions on welfare to the courts.153
In AOSI, the Policy Requirement restricted recipients from expressing an opinion that
combaters of HIV/AIDs should work with prostitutes rather than condemn them.154 These
conditions removed important opinions from the public discourse and thus truncated the
development of truth in those areas. Speech-conditioned funding implicates the
development of knowledge theory of the First Amendment, and is scrutinized
accordingly.
The AOSI limits–leverage standard furthers the development of knowledge rationale
for protecting free speech. By incorporating the alternative channels, viewpoint-based
discrimination, compelled speech, and government speech doctrines, the limits–leverage
standard preserves diversity in the “marketplace of ideas.” First, the alternative channels
test directly advances a variety of ideas by inquiring whether recipients have another
means of expressing themselves in the market. Second, the viewpoint-based
discrimination doctrine, which raises scrutiny of conditions that limit discussion of
controversial topics, furthers the development of knowledge by rendering suspect
conditions that seek to restrict a particular viewpoint in the marketplace of ideas.155 Third,
the standard’s heightened suspicion of conditions that compel certain speech recognizes
that to force a recipient to profess a statement of belief directly constrains the variety of
opinions in society.156 Finally, the government speech doctrine recognizes that the
government may express its opinions as well, contributing to the development of
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knowledge as any other actor.157 The limits–leverage standard, by incorporating a range
of conditional funding doctrines, protects free speech and thus properly maintains the
diversity of the marketplace of ideas.

VIII. THE LIMITS–LEVERAGE STANDARD: LITTLE IMPACT
¶47

In theory, the limits–leverage standard is a victory for challengers to speech-related
funding conditions. It not only applies the speech-conditioned funding cases more
systematically than the Court’s prior tactic of applying whatever doctrine most closely fit
the facts, but it supports free speech protection from speech-related funding conditions to
advance the development of knowledge. Nonetheless, because AOSI did not extend the
constitutional protection of the First Amendment to foreign recipients,158 the limits–
leverage standard will not be an effective means of protecting the free speech of many
speech-conditioned funding recipients.
A. Congress Can Circumvent AOSI in Foreign Aid Cases

¶48

Generally, foreign nationals do not receive the same constitutional benefits as U.S.
citizens, particularly when those foreign nationals are outside of the United States.159
Consequently, the AOSI decision does not protect foreign organizations.160 Thus,
Congress may impose certain conditions on funding based on the identity of the
recipient161 and can burden funds on restrictions that would be unconstitutional if applied
to U.S. recipients.162 The practical implications of AOSI will be limited if Congress
chooses to allocate funds to foreign recipients over domestic ones so that it may regulate
recipients’ speech. The limits–leverage standard will neither protect free speech nor
promote the development of knowledge with respect to conditions on foreign aid if its
protections do not apply to recipients of speech-conditioned funds.
157
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Congress frequently prefers to allocate foreign aid funds to foreign, rather than
domestic, organizations.163 Foreign organizations often have greater access to areas and
people in need of foreign aid than their American counterparts.164 For programs that seek
to affect international human rights, foreign governance, democracy, global health, and
other issues, it is often just as effective for Congress to fund foreign organizations to
implement the programs as domestic ones.165 Beginning in the 1980s, the U.S.
government has relied increasingly on foreign NGOs to deliver developmental and
humanitarian aid in aid-receiving countries, precisely because they generally have
immense local and national expertise.166 As a result, the number of foreign NGOs has
rapidly increased since the 1990s.167
Furthermore, USAID habitually distributes federal funds conditioned on restrictions
of speech to foreign NGOs. A well-known example is the Mexico City Policy, also
known as the Global Gag Rule.168 Enforced sporadically from 1984 to 2009, the Mexico
City Policy explicitly prohibited foreign recipients of U.S. family planning grants from
engaging in abortion services.169 The policy precluded alternative channels for engaging
in abortion-related activities because it proscribed recipients’ speech regardless of
whether the recipients funded the activity using public or private funds.170 Although
League of Women Voters struck down a condition on funds for U.S. recipients on the
grounds that it created precisely this situation,171 legal challenges to the Mexico City
Policy were unsuccessful.172 Consequently, some scholars argue the condition
inappropriately held foreign organizations to a higher standard than their domestic
counterparts, a discrepancy that both undermined fundamental constitutional values that
the United States sought to promote internationally and presented the country as being
hypocritical.173
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More recently, Congress, through USAID, has continued to condition funds to
foreign NGOs on restrictions of free speech through its funding application process. For
example, pursuant to the Paraguay Democracy and Governance Program, USAID called
for applications for funding solely from Paraguayan organizations.174 USAID required
that the program “be implemented by a local organization”; as such, applicants must have
been organized under the laws of Paraguay with their principal places of business in
Paraguay.175 Similarly, as part of the Vietnamese branch of its Strategic Information
Capacity for Sustainable HIV Response Program, USAID called only for applications
from local Vietnamese organizations, requiring applicants to be similarly tied to Vietnam
as the Paraguay program.176
In USAID’s Afghanistan’s Counter Trafficking in Persons Program, the agency
called for applicants with “local knowledge.”177 The application articulated the need for
NGO partners with a “solid understanding” of local values and customs with respect to
human trafficking.178 Although applications were not explicitly limited to foreign
organizations, intimate knowledge of the country conditions was an explicit requirement
of the program.179 If it finds that foreign organizations have a more intimate knowledge
of local conditions, USAID can limit actual distribution of funds to foreign recipients.180
Note that each of these programs specifically targets USAID goals in certain
countries. USAID can funnel broader international goals into specific countries to target
local applicants.181 By confining programs to certain countries, USAID can further target
foreign recipients, which will in turn allow it to impose greater conditions on speech.

IX. CONCLUSION
¶54

In AOSI, the Supreme Court articulated a new standard to determine whether
speech-conditioned funding encroaches on recipients’ First Amendment rights. The line
the Court drew, between conditions that “define the limits of the government spending
program” and those that “seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours
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of the program itself,”182 incorporated the alternative channels, viewpoint-based
discrimination, compelled speech, and government speech doctrines. Applying this
limits–leverage standard to the Leadership Act, the Court held that the Policy
Requirement conditioning the receipt of funds on the adoption of a statement explicitly
opposing the practice of prostitution unlawfully violated American recipients’ First
Amendment rights to free speech.183
The limits–leverage standard creates a more systematic analysis of funding
conditions that implicate free speech than the Court’s prior approach of applying
whatever doctrine most closely fit the facts. It also promulgates the primary justification
for protecting federal funding recipients’ freedom of speech. However, the new standard
is unlikely to significantly improve protections of free speech in foreign aid programs
because the First Amendment does not protect foreign organizations as robustly as it does
U.S. ones. Because Congress can allocate foreign aid funding to foreign recipients if it
wishes to continue to impose speech-implicating conditions on foreign aid funds, in
practice the AOSI standard is unlikely to advance the ideals that underlie First
Amendment protections for speech-conditioned funding recipients.
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